Collecting debt in Iowa: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“Partial payment or an oral promise to pay a debt will not toll the running of the statute. Hootman v. Beatty, 228 Iowa 591, 293 N.W. 32; In re Estate of Sleezer, 209 Iowa 56, 227 N.W. 644.”

“Causes of action founded on contract are revived by an admission in writing, signed by the party to be charged, that the debt is unpaid, or by a like new promise to pay the same.”

Limited borrowing statute: 'When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of any country where the defendant has previously resided, such bar shall be the same defense here as though it had arisen under the provisions of this chapter; but this section shall not apply to causes of action arising within this state.' It imports only a bar that already ran where the defendant previously resided, never a longer foreign period, and never applies to causes arising in Iowa.

“An intentional misrepresentation, or a representation which tends to create a false impression of the character, extent or amount of a debt, or of its status in a legal proceeding.”

Both passes read all of § 537.7103; it contains no requirement to disclose that a debt is time-barred and no reference to limitations periods. The closest provision is § 537.7103(4)(e), quoted, on misrepresenting the status of a debt. The Iowa act reaches creditors collecting their own debts (§ 537.7102(5)). Federal Regulation F (12 CFR 1006.26) still bars suits and threats of suit on time-barred debt.

Revival of a barred contract claim requires an admission in writing signed by the party to be charged, or a like written new promise (§ 614.11). Oliver v. Glanton addressed a debt already barred: services rendered 1947-1949 on an oral agreement, a partial payment in 1957, suit after that; the court held 'Partial payment or an oral promise to pay a debt will not toll the running of the statute' and quoted Sleezer: 'The legislature has definitely pointed out the method that is available to raise the bar of the statute of limitations. It expressly requires a written promise or a written acknowledgment.' Burns v. Burns: a § 614.11 writing may be made before or after the statute has run and waives the defense; the statute suspends the remedy and does not annihilate the debt. On a continuous, open, current account a payment made while the account is still running is a new 'last item' that fixes accrual under § 614.5; that is accrual, not revival, and no Iowa authority was found treating a payment made after the five years have run as reopening a barred account.