Collecting debt in New Mexico: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“Causes of action founded upon contract shall be revived by the making of any partial or installment payment thereon or by an admission that the debt is unpaid, as well as by a new promise to pay the same; but such admission or new promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith.”

Yes for debts whose period is set by Chapter 37 (written contracts § 37-1-3, accounts and unwritten contracts § 37-1-4), provided the payment is voluntary: Lea County State Bank, 2015-NMCA-026 ¶ 11 (read from the slip opinion PDF): 'for a partial payment to revive an action, the partial payment must be voluntary' (quoting Joslin: 'only voluntary payments can trigger the revival statute because only voluntary payments represent the debtor's acknowledgment of the debt giving rise to a new promise'); payments made through foreclosure or forced sale of collateral are involuntary. No for debts whose period is set outside Chapter 37, principally UCC Article 2 sale-of-goods contracts (§ 55-2-725, four years): Autovest v. Agosto holds § 37-1-17 ('None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to any action or suit which, by any particular statute of this state, is limited to be commenced within a different time') bars the partial payment rule there.

“Such a cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued upon the date of such partial or installment payment, admission of indebtedness or promise to pay.”

Both passes agree. The admission or new promise must be in a writing signed by the party to be charged. Same Chapter 37 scope limit as partial payment: § 37-1-17 excludes the revival statute from claims with a period set outside Chapter 37 (Autovest).

Both passes agree: no general borrowing statute in Chapter 37, Article 1 (all thirty sections checked). The only borrowing-type clause is § 37-1-2 for out-of-state judgments: 'may be brought within the applicable period of limitation within that jurisdiction, not to exceed fourteen years from the date of the judgment.' Choice of law otherwise follows the forum rule stated in the compiler's annotation: 'Statutes of limitation are procedural and the law of the forum governs matters of procedure and New Mexico statutes of limitation apply even if the claim is governed by another state's substantive law. Nez v. Forney.' The Nez opinion itself was not read.

“It is an unfair or deceptive trade practice for any debt collector ... to collect or to attempt to collect from any person any payment of any debt that the debt collector knows or has reason to know is a time-barred debt ... unless the debt collector discloses the following information”

Both passes agree. Applies to original creditors, assignees/debt buyers and third-party collectors (12.2.12.7(D)). 12.2.12.8 imposes a good-faith duty to determine whether each debt is time-barred. Required content (12.2.12.9(A)): that the debt is or may be unenforceable through a lawsuit; that the person cannot be required to pay through a lawsuit; that the person need not sign any admission or make any payment; and an explanation of the § 37-1-16 revival consequences. Safe-harbor text (12.2.12.9(B)): 'This debt may be too old for you to be sued on it in court. If it is too old, you can't be required to pay it through a lawsuit. You can renew the debt and start the time for the filing of a lawsuit against you to collect the debt if you do any of the following: make any payment of the debt; sign a paper in which you admit that you owe the debt ...'. Written disclosures must be clear and conspicuous on the front page (E); oral disclosures immediately before or after the first payment request (F); non-English demands must carry the disclosure in that language (D). Violation is an Unfair Practices Act violation (12.2.12.10). Every section is marked 'N, 12/15/10' with no later amendment. 12.2.12.7(I) defines time-barred debt as 'not enforceable in a judicial proceeding because the applicable statute of limitation has run'.

YES, after the bar, for debts governed by Chapter 37 periods (written contracts, accounts, unwritten contracts), if the payment is voluntary. Lea County State Bank, 2015-NMCA-026 ¶ 11 (Court of Appeals, read in full): 'Although the term "revival" suggests that the thing being revived has "expired[,]" ... our case law and other legal authorities are clear that "revival" works to restart the running of the statute of limitations before, as well as after, the statute of limitations has expired', citing Davis v. Savage ('it is generally regarded as immaterial whether the acknowledgment precedes or follows the bar') and Romero v. Hopewell (the revival statute 'applies ... to admissions or new promises made before the debt becomes barred as [well as] to those made afterwards'); 'for a partial payment to revive an action, the partial payment must be voluntary.' When revived, 'the statute of limitations starts anew.' The AG's mandatory disclosure (12.2.12.9(B)) warns the consumer of exactly this. NO for debts whose period is set outside Chapter 37, principally UCC Article 2 sale-of-goods contracts under § 55-2-725 (retail installment contracts, store cards): the Supreme Court in Autovest v. Agosto (slip opinion read in full) held 'Section 37-1-16's partial payment rule does not override or otherwise supersede the mandatory terms of the exclusion provision' (§ 37-1-17) and noted that 'New Mexico's partial payment doctrine has existed solely in statute' and no New Mexico court 'has ever recognized the common law partial payment doctrine.' Gentry v. Gentry, 59 N.M. 395 (1955), which held partial payments on oral loans did not revive them, applied the pre-1957 version of the statute that covered only written admissions and promises; the partial-payment clause was added in 1957, so Gentry is not in tension with the current text. Status: remedy barred, not extinguished (12.2.12.7(I) NMAC; the revival statute presupposes the debt survives).