State directory

Collecting debt in Georgia: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

Georgia has no state license, registration or bond for third-party collection agencies or debt buyers; the Department of Banking and Finance states it does not regulate collection agencies or debt collectors, and collector conduct is governed by the federal FDCPA and Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act (O.C.G.A. 10-1-393), enforced by the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division.

No state license Written contracts: 6 yearsVerified 2026-09-20

General information, not legal advice. Every figure on this page links to the statute, rule or regulator page it came from, with the operative words quoted, and the date we verified it. Rules change; confirm with the regulator or your counsel before acting, and tell us if something here is out of date.

Licensing and bonding

Do you need a license to collect in Georgia?

Georgia has no collection agency license, registration or bond; the state banking regulator says so in writing. Agencies that buy or service Georgia consumer installment loans of $3,000 or less should check whether the Georgia Installment Loan Act lender license applies to them.

Requirement
No state license
No collection-agency licensing statute exists. Regulator statement: Georgia Department of Banking and Finance, 'Debt Collection' page. Related conduct statute: O.C.G.A. 10-1-393(a) (Fair Business Practices Act). Not a collection bond: O.C.G.A. 10-6-100 (bill-payment agents only).
Who enforces conduct
None for collection agencies. The Georgia Department of Banking and Finance expressly disclaims jurisdiction; consumer complaints go to the Georgia Department of Law, Consumer Protection Division (attorney collectors: State Bar of Georgia).
Regulator page
Surety bond
None

No bond for collection agencies. O.C.G.A. 10-6-100 requires a $50,000.00 bond filed with the superior court clerk, but only for businesses that receive cash from patrons as the patron's agent to pay the patron's obligations to third parties (bill-payment agents), with exemptions for fewer than 20 payments per month or written authorization from the third party. Third-party summaries sometimes misdescribe this as a collection-agency bond; it is not one.

O.C.G.A. 10-6-100 (bill-payment agents; not collection agencies)

Adjacent rules. Not applicable; there is no collection-agency licensing statute to be exempt from. O.C.G.A. 7-3-4(b) exempts banks, trust companies, savings institutions, credit unions, pawnbrokers, the University System and student loan transactions from the Installment Loan Act lender license. O.C.G.A. 10-6-100 bond exemptions: fewer than 20 payments per month, or written authorization from the third party.

Statutes of limitations

How long can a debt be sued on in Georgia?

Georgia courts apply the six-year written-contract period to credit card debt when the creditor can produce the cardholder agreement; without it, the four-year open-account period is the likely exposure. A partial payment revives or extends a Georgia debt only if the debtor also signs a writing acknowledging it.

Written contract
6 years
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24
“All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11 or to negotiable instruments under Article 3 of Title 11.”
Oral contract
4 years
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25; § 9-3-26
“All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.”
Promissory note
6 years
O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118(a) (UCC 3-118 as adopted); § 9-3-24 excludes negotiable instruments
“an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date.”
Open account and credit card
6 years
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 as applied in Hill v. American Express, 289 Ga. App. 576, 657 S.E.2d 547 (2008); Phoenix Recovery Group, Inc. v. Mehta, 291 Ga. App. 874, 663 S.E.2d 290 (2008); see Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 786 S.E.2d 903 (2016)
“In this case, there is a simple contract in writing. That the contract was agreed to, not by signature, but by use of the card does not take it out of OCGA § 9-3-24.”

Credit cards are treated as simple contracts in writing (6 years, 9-3-24) where the creditor puts the written cardholder agreement in the record. Hill (Jan. 24, 2008): 'American Express has submitted a copy of the contract between the cardholder and the Bank' and 'the form of Hill's acceptance is immaterial and the provisions of OCGA § 9-3-24 governing contracts in writing apply.' Mehta (June 12, 2008) reached 'the same conclusion' on a signed application plus the cardholder agreement and reversed a judgment for the debtor. Houghton (May 31, 2016) did not decide between four and six years: it reversed summary judgment for a debt buyer that produced no written contract because the claim was untimely 'even if the longer period applied.' Open account with no written agreement in evidence falls under 9-3-25 (4 years) by the statute's own text; no Court of Appeals opinion was found that squarely applies four years to a card claim with no produced agreement, so that outcome is an inference from 9-3-25, not a holding.

Judgment
7 yearsrenewable
O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60(a)(1); § 9-12-61; foreign judgments § 9-3-20 (5 years)
“A judgment shall become dormant and shall not be enforced: (1) When seven years shall elapse after the rendition of the judgment before execution is issued thereon and is entered on the general execution docket of the county in which the judgment was rendered”
When the clock starts, and what restarts it
Accrual

Written contracts run from when the sum 'become[s] due and payable' (9-3-24); open accounts from when 'the right of action accrues' (9-3-25). Houghton v. Sacor (2016): the period runs from breach, i.e., the date the required minimum payment was missed ('a payment due date of May 5, 2006 ... the record further authorized a finding that Houghton was then in breach'); a June 2012 suit was untimely even under six years. No Georgia statute fixes charge-off or last payment as the accrual event. Judgment dormancy runs 7 years from rendition unless execution is entered on the general execution docket (9-12-60).

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24; § 9-3-25; Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254 (2016)
Partial payment restarts the period
It depends
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-112; § 9-3-110; Bingham v. Advance Indus. Sec., 138 Ga. App. 875 (1976); Garrett v. Lincoln Cemetery, 148 Ga. App. 744 (1979)
“A payment entered upon a written evidence of debt by the debtor or upon any other written acknowledgment of the existing liability shall be equivalent to a new promise to pay.”
Written acknowledgment restarts the period
Yes
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-110; § 9-3-113
“A new promise, in order to renew a right of action already barred or to constitute a point from which the limitation shall commence running on a right of action not yet barred, shall be in writing, either in the party's own handwriting or subscribed by him or someone authorized by him.”
Borrowing statute
No
O.C.G.A. Title 9, Ch. 3 (Art. 1 §§ 9-3-1 to 9-3-7; Art. 5 §§ 9-3-90 to 9-3-99) contains no borrowing provision

Negative finding from reading the limitations chapter's section lists in both passes; no statute says so affirmatively. Georgia applies its own periods as forum law (lex fori); the only foreign-related rule is 9-3-20 (5 years to sue on a foreign judgment). No case cite for the lex-fori rule was read; treat as medium confidence.

Time-barred debt
Status after the period runs
Unenforceable

The debt exists but cannot be sued on; a suit can be defended by raising the defense.

Collector must disclose that the debt is time-barred
No
A payment revives a time-barred debt
It depends
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-110; § 9-3-112; § 9-3-113; Bingham v. Advance Indus. Sec., 138 Ga. App. 875 (1976); Garrett v. Lincoln Cemetery, 148 Ga. App. 744 (1979)

9-3-110 expressly reaches 'a right of action already barred' but requires a signed writing; 9-3-112 makes a payment equivalent to a new promise only if 'entered upon a written evidence of debt by the debtor or upon any other written acknowledgment.' 9-3-113: 'A new promise shall revive or extend the original liability; it shall not create a new one.' Annotated cases: 'Mere partial payment, in absence of a writing, is not sufficient to revive or extend original debt' (Bingham); a notated check sufficed (Garrett); Anderson v. Kaye, 371 Ga. App. 626 (2024) (payments not acknowledged toward the specific debt did not renew); Bankr. M.D. Ga. No. 13-51318 reads 9-3-112 as two elements, a payment plus a debtor writing. A bare payment with no debtor writing does not revive a barred debt.

Sources

Where this page comes from.

Researched in two independent passes from primary sources (the statute, the administrative code and the regulator's own pages), then reconciled against the text where the passes disagreed. Verified 2026-09-20. Licensing is re-verified quarterly and limitation periods annually.

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