Collecting debt in Florida: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“(2) WITHIN FIVE YEARS.— ... (b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, except for an action to enforce a claim against a payment bond”

'Founded on a written instrument' is a term of art: the writing must on its face establish all elements of the claim. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Hillsborough County, 129 Fla. 98, 176 So. 72, 75 (Fla. 1935), as applied in ARDC Corp. v. Hogan, 656 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995): a contract action is not founded on a written instrument 'where the written instrument is "a link in the chain of evidence to prove the cause of action," but does not on its face establish all of the elements of plaintiff's claim'; such claims take the four-year period.

“(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.— ... (j) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts.”

“673.1181 Statute of limitations.—Chapter 95 governs when an action to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this chapter must be commenced.”

“(j) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts.”

Florida has no credit-card category; the period is four or five years depending on the theory pleaded and the proof. Five years under 95.11(2)(b) only if the claim is 'founded on a written instrument', which under Gulf Life and ARDC means the writing itself (a cardholder agreement the debtor is bound by, plus the terms it fixes) establishes every element of liability on its face; if the writing is only 'a link in the chain of evidence' the claim is four years. Credit-card suits in Florida are usually pleaded as account stated or open account; the Fourth DCA in Farley (a credit-card case, quoting the Supreme Court's 1912 Whittington opinion) describes an account stated as based on 'the agreement of the parties to pay the amount due upon the accounting, and not any written instrument', which places such claims in 95.11(3)(j) at four years, though Farley and Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) decided pleading and fee questions, not limitations. Knighten (S.D. Fla. 2010, Magistrate Judge Garber) applied four years to a credit-card debt because the only cardholder agreement offered post-dated the account: 'pursuant to Fla. Stat. 95.11, an action that is not based on a written document must commence within four years.' The reconciler read 95.11, ARDC (Caselaw Access Project text), Farley (Justia PDF), Ham (FindLaw), Whittington (CAP) and Knighten (CAP); none is a Florida appellate holding that fixes credit-card accounts in one category, and CourtListener searches found none. The years field is null because a single number would mislead; treat as four years unless the creditor can prove a written agreement that establishes liability on its face. The 95.10 borrowing statute separately bars a claim already barred under the cardholder agreement's governing law (e.g. Delaware's three years) if the cause of action arose there.

“(1) WITHIN TWENTY YEARS.— An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state.”

55.081: 'no judgment, order, or decree of any court shall be a lien upon real or personal property within the state after the expiration of 20 years from the date of the entry of such judgment, order, or decree.' 'Renewable: yes' rests on 95.11(1), which permits an action on the judgment within 20 years, and on the 55.10 rerecording mechanism; neither pass read a statute or case on whether a new judgment obtained by such an action carries its own 20-year period.

“(4) WITHIN THREE YEARS.— An action to collect medical debt for services rendered by a facility licensed under chapter 395, provided that the period of limitations shall run from the date on which the facility refers the medical debt to a third party for collection.”

Applies only to debt for services rendered by a chapter 395 facility (hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers), not to physician-practice or other provider debt, which stays under 95.11(2)(b)/(3)(j). Accrual is statutory: three years from the date the facility refers the debt to a third party for collection, not from service or default. Ch. 2024-183 also created s. 222.26 (additional property exemptions for such medical debt). The 95.11 history line confirms 's. 1, ch. 2024-183'.