Collecting debt in Kentucky: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“a partial payment on an obligation made before it is barred by limitation is prima facie an acknowledgment that the residue is unpaid and of a continuing liability therefor ... a payment starts the running of the statute of limitation from the date of payment.”

“a new promise to pay a debt not barred by limitation merely cuts off antecedent time and extends the period of statutory limitation from the date of the new promise ... no set form of words is necessary, nor is it required to be in writing.”

413.320: 'When a cause of action has arisen in another state or country, and by the laws of this state or country where the cause of action accrued the time for the commencement of an action thereon is limited to a shorter period of time than the period of limitation prescribed by the laws of this state for a like cause of action, then said action shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said shorter period.' Applied in Conway v. PRA (E.D. Ky. 2014) to a Virginia-law card agreement (3 years). 413.330 bars actions on foreign judgments that are time-barred where rendered, with an exception for Kentucky-resident original holders.

“Unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”

Both passes searched KRS ch. 413 and ch. 367. Kentucky has no debt-collection licensing act, no state debt-collection practices act and no statute requiring a collector to disclose that a debt is time-barred; only KRS 367.170 and the federal FDCPA / Regulation F (12 CFR 1006.26) apply.

Common law; Kentucky has no acknowledgment or part-payment statute and has not adopted Lord Tenterden's Act (Boone), so no writing is required. Vinson addressed notes already barred by the five-year statute: a $20 payment made in 1939 on notes that matured in 1929-1932 'had the effect of an express promise to pay ... and operated to lift the bar of limitation which had become complete when the payment was made,' and revived the full amount against the payor. Limits: the payment or promise must be unequivocal and voluntary (a promise to 'pay or make some arrangements' was insufficient in Vinson); a payment by one joint obligor does not revive the debt against co-obligors absent consent or ratification; a new promise on a barred debt creates a new obligation on which the action must be brought (Cox; Hutsell), and an express acknowledgment of a barred debt proved by clear and convincing evidence raises an implied promise to pay (Hutsell). The bar is remedial, so the debt is unenforceable, not extinguished.