Collecting debt in Louisiana: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription may be made verbally, in writing, by partial payment, by payment of interest or by pledge, or in other ways; or it may be implicit or inferred from the facts and circumstances.”

“Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe.”

A conflict-of-laws rule rather than a classic borrowing statute. Louisiana prescription law applies when Louisiana substantive law governs (3549(A)). When another state's substantive law governs, Louisiana prescription still applies except: an action barred in Louisiana is dismissed unless not barred in the other state and 'compelling considerations of remedial justice' warrant it (3549(B)(1)); an action not barred in Louisiana is maintained unless barred in the other state and Louisiana's policies do not warrant maintaining it (3549(B)(2)); a non-resident plaintiff's action is barred if the other state's limitation is substantive there (3549(C)). Art. 3501 para. 2 separately bars enforcement of a foreign judgment that is prescribed or unenforceable where rendered.

“the creditor, including, but not limited to the creditor in a consumer credit transaction, shall not contact any person other than an extender of credit or credit reporting agency who is not living, residing, or present in the household of the debtor regarding the debtor's obligation to pay a debt.”

Both passes read R.S. 9:3562 in full; it regulates third-party contacts and cease-contact requests only, and 9:3562(4)(b) expressly permits 'making amicable demand and filing suit on the debt.' No Louisiana statute requiring disclosure that a debt is prescribed was located. Louisiana has no collection-agency licensing act. Federal Regulation F (12 CFR 1006.26) governs suits and threats of suit on time-barred debt.

Louisiana distinguishes interruption from renunciation. A partial payment or acknowledgment made while prescription is still running interrupts it and the full period starts anew (arts. 3464, 3466). Once prescription has accrued, interruption no longer applies and only renunciation revives the claim: 'Prescription may be renounced only after it has accrued' (art. 3449); 'Renunciation may be express or tacit. Tacit renunciation results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned' (art. 3450). Lima v. Schmidt: renunciation 'obliterates the effect of prescription that has run,' 'is subject to more stringent requirements than acknowledgment,' 'must be clear, direct, and absolute and manifested by words or actions of the party in whose favor prescription has run,' and 'requires a new promise to pay the debt, as a new obligation binding on the debtor is created when a promise to pay is made after prescription has accrued.' A prescribed debt survives as a natural obligation (art. 1762(1)); a payment freely made on it 'may not be reclaimed' (art. 1761) but does not by itself revive the balance unless it amounts to a clear and absolute renunciation. No case was found holding that a bare partial payment after prescription is, without more, a tacit renunciation of the whole balance.