Collecting debt in Delaware: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“The debt must be pointed out and the intention to partly discharge that particular debt made clear, and there must be no surrounding circumstances to repel the implied promise to pay the balance.”

A partial payment on a debt not yet barred restarts the three-year period because 'a new promise to pay is implied from the partial payment of the debt' (Foley, quoting Patamon), and the period runs anew from default on the new promise. The rule carries an express proviso from Hart v. Deshong (read from the Caselaw Access Project text): the payment must identify the debt and there must be no circumstances repelling the implied promise. In Foley, seven consecutive monthly payments made 'before that critical point' (expiry) were held to lift the bar; in Johns a single undocumented payment was held insufficient on summary judgment. Recorded as conditional because the source itself states the condition.

“For the statute to be tolled there must be a 'clear, distinct and unequivocal acknowledgment of a subsisting debt and a recognition of an obligation to pay it.' Furthermore, '[t]here should be no uncertainty as to the debt referred to by an acknowledgment or new promise.'”

An acknowledgment lifts the bar only if it is direct and unconditional; Hart v. Deshong: 'when an acknowledgment is qualified or conditional no absolute removal of the bar can be had until the qualification has been removed or the condition complied with', and an acknowledgment that 'expressly negatives the promise to pay has no effect upon the bar'. A signed written acknowledgment of a subsisting demand also gets the six-year period of 8109. Oral acknowledgment can suffice at common law (Hart: 'The acknowledgment, written or oral, is an admission by word').

Quote: 'Where a cause of action arises outside of this State, an action cannot be brought in a court of this State to enforce such cause of action after the expiration of whichever is shorter, the time limited by the law of this State, or the time limited by the law of the state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of action. Where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a person who at the time of such accrual was a resident of this State, the time limited by the law of this State shall apply.' Shorter-of-the-two rule with a Delaware-resident-plaintiff exception. History: 46 Del. Laws c. 254 § 1; 10 Del. C. 1953 § 8120.

Both passes searched the Delaware Code (10 Del. C. ch. 81; 6 Del. C. ch. 25J and the rest of Title 6) and found no statute requiring a time-barred-debt disclosure and no state debt-collection practices act or collection-agency licensing act containing one. Only federal Regulation F, 12 C.F.R. 1006.26(b), applies. Recorded as 'no' with the caveat that absence was established by search, not by a statute saying so. Status 'unenforceable': 8106(a) bars the action ('no action ... shall be brought') rather than extinguishing the debt, and Delaware courts describe the bar as one that can be 'lifted' by acknowledgment or payment (Hart v. Deshong; Foley).

No Delaware authority decides whether a payment made after the period has expired revives the debt. Johns, p. 4: 'Although it is well-settled that a payment on account not yet time-barred tolls the statute, the affect of a payment made on a debt that is already barred by the statute has not been addressed by the Delaware courts. It is not necessary to reach that question at this time.' Hart v. Deshong itself (read from the Caselaw Access Project text) expressly left the point open: 'it is not necessary to give any consideration to the question as to any possible distinction between a payment on account before the Statute of Limitations has run, and a payment on account of an indebtedness already barred by the Statute.' Patamon and Foley both involved payments made before expiry. No Delaware statute addresses revival of barred consumer debt, and no anti-revival provision exists. If a Delaware court did allow revival, the Hart/Kojro standard (clear, unequivocal, identifying the debt, no repelling circumstances) would presumably apply, but that is inference, not holding.