Collecting debt in District of Columbia: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“This section does not alter or take away, or lessen the effect of a payment of principal or interest made by any person.”

Before the period expires, a payment of principal or interest keeps its common-law effect of restarting the period (28-3504, second sentence). After expiry, 28-3814(l) removes that effect for consumer debt: 'any subsequent payment toward or written or oral affirmation of such consumer debt shall not extend the limitations period.' Neither pass located a D.C. Court of Appeals decision stating the pre-expiry common-law rule.

“an acknowledgement, or promise, by words only is not sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations ... unless the acknowledgement, or promise, is in writing, signed by the party chargeable thereby.”

A signed written acknowledgment or promise can restart the period on a simple contract before expiry; after expiry, 28-3814(l) bars any 'written or oral affirmation' from extending the consumer-debt period. Pass A stated that Title 12 chapter 3 has no acknowledgment statute; that is correct as to chapter 3, but the acknowledgment statute sits in Title 28 (28-3504), which pass B found and the reconciler confirmed on code.dccouncil.gov.

12-307: 'An action upon a judgment or decree rendered in a State, territory, commonwealth or possession of the United States or in a foreign country is barred if by the laws of that jurisdiction, the action would there be barred and the judgment or decree would be incapable of being otherwise enforced there.' That is a judgment-specific borrowing rule, not a general one for contract claims. D.C. choice-of-law on limitations is case law, not read by either pass; confidence on this field is medium.

“No debt collector shall use any unfair, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representation ... including: ... (10) initiating a cause of action to collect a consumer debt when the debt collector knows or reasonably should know that the applicable statute of limitations period has expired”

D.C. does not require a scripted time-barred notice in collection communications. Instead it (1) makes suing on expired consumer debt a prohibited practice, 28-3814(f)(10); (2) requires every collection complaint to allege 'That the suit is filed within the applicable statute of limitations period', 28-3814(q)(6) (pass B cited this as (r)(6); the reconciler confirmed on the Code site that it is paragraph (6) of subsection (q), the complaint-attachment subsection, while (r) concerns pre-judgment evidence); and (3) bars revival, 28-3814(l). 'Debt collector' includes 'an original creditor or debt buyer' (28-3814(b)(5)), so all three apply to first-party creditors. Federal Regulation F, 12 C.F.R. 1006.26(b), also applies. District of Columbia Municipal Regulations were not checked by either pass.

Statutory anti-revival, confirmed from the Code text: 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the applicable statute of limitations period for an action to collect consumer debt has expired, any subsequent payment toward or written or oral affirmation of such consumer debt shall not extend the limitations period.' Applies to all consumer debt and to every 'debt collector', which 28-3814(b)(5) defines to include an original creditor. The authority addresses a debt already barred by its terms. Combined with (f)(10), a time-barred consumer debt cannot be sued on and cannot be revived; the debt is not declared extinguished, so status is 'unenforceable'.